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THE MANIPULATION OF PUBLIC OPINION
BY THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
ERIN MYERs
INTRODUCTION
From the first lawsuit brought against it in 1954,1 the tobacco in-
dustry (hereinafter industry) has used its vast resources2 to implement
a series of successful strategies to defeat plaintiff claims.' The industry
has utilized its tremendous wealth to sway public opinion4 and en-
courage victorious litigation.5 This ability to influence the public may
be a thing of the past as evidence continues to emerge indicating foul
play among the industry giants. The resentful public sentiment result-
ing from the industry's fraudulent behavior has perpetuated unprece-
dented litigation which could inevitably lead to industry downfall.
Part I of this paper will examine the distinct phases of tobacco
litigation and illustrate the effectiveness of the industry's various legal
strategies with a primary focus on its manipulation of public opinion.
The current shift in public opinion towards the tobacco industry and
the industry's response will be examined in Part II. Part II will also
examine the tobacco settlement previously proposed before Congress
and the effectiveness of the industry's attempt to invoke public sup-
port. Throughout, this paper will explore both the effectiveness and
morality of the tobacco industry's abuse of resources in swaying public
opinion and its likelihood of success in the future.
1. Lowe v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9673(C) (E.D. Mo. filed Mar. 10, 1954).
2. See Elizabeth A. Frohlich, Note, Statutes Aiding States Recovery of Medicaid Costs from
Tobacco Companies: A Better Strategy for Redressing an Identifiable Harm?, 21 AM. J.L. & MED.
445, 445 (1995) (describing the tobacco industry as a $45 billion per year industry).
3. See Tucker S. Player, Note, After The Fall: The Cigarette Papers, The Global Settlement,
and the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REv. 311, 313 (1998).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 313-19.
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I. HISTORY OF PUBLIC OPINION IN TOBACCO LITIGATION
From 1954 to 1994, 813 claims were filed against the tobacco in-
dustry.6 Of these claims, only twenty-three were tried; and although
the industry lost two cases at the trial level, both were overturned on
appeal.7 Over the years, these cases have taken on distinct characteris-
tics which have allowed the history of the cases to be broken into
three waves.8 In each wave, the explanation for the lawsuits' failure is
considered to lie more with jury sentiment than with legal opinion.9
In the first wave, the industry was able to evoke enough doubt among
jurors to defeat the legal standard at the time which required that
smoking be the actual and only cause of the plaintiffs injury.1 ° In the
second and third waves, the risks associated with smoking were public
knowledge. Therefore, juries began to assess more blame on individ-
ual plaintiffs who had made the conscious decision to smoke despite
knowledge of the consequential health risks. 1 Aware of the signifi-
cant connection between public opinion and success in the court-
room, the tobacco industry has taken drastic measures to elicit public
support and assure successful claims.
A. Public Opinion During the First Wave (1950-1970)
During the first wave of tobacco litigation, the public's percep-
tion about smoking changed, as the links between smoking and can-
cer were discovered and publicized. 2 When the public began to
discover that cancer was linked to smoking, smokers began to sue to-
bacco companies. 3 As a result, the industry adopted a never-say-die
litigation strategy in which it attempted to frustrate or settle all
claims. 4 First, the industry used its tremendous resources to force
plaintiffs out of litigation by using delaying pretrial tactics. 5 Second,
the industry utilized scientific experts to frustrate plaintiffs' causation
6. See Elsa F. Kramer, Feature, Waiting To Exhale: Tobacco Lawyers are Getting Burned by
Damaging Industry Revelation. Can They Rise From the Ashes?, 39 RES GESTAE 20, 20 (May
1996) [hereinafter Waiting to Exhale].
7. See id.
8. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv.
853, 854 (1992) (coining the wave motif for the tobacco litigation history) [hereinafter
Sociolegal History].
9. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POL-
TICS, AND CULTURE 131, 156 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
10. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 65-86 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
14. See infta notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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claims. 6 Finally, the industry used foreseeability as a defense to plain-
tiff suits by claiming that it had no knowledge that smoking caused
cancer, thereby denying liability.17 As a result of these litigation tac-
tics, the industry survived the first wave without sustaining much loss.
Before the first wave of tobacco litigation, health concerns played
a small role in the public's perception of smoking."i In fact, smoking
had social status; it was viewed as young and cosmopolitan.1" Further-
more, smoking was portrayed positively in popular culture, as movie
stars who smoked were considered cool and in control.2 ° This social
view changed dramatically as the first reports21 linking smoking and
cancer were published in the early 1950s.2 2 Their publication in
Reader's Digest proved significant as the findings were mass-marketed
in a readable fashion to the average person. 3 Similarly, televised pro-
grams like Edward R. Murrow's "See it Now" expounded the health
risks of smoking to a mass audience.24 As a result of this increased
public awareness of the dangers of smoking, many smokers began to
sue the tobacco companies.
Hundreds of lawsuits ensued over the next twenty years,25 but the
industry was able to "score a knockout."26 The industry responded to
the onslaught of litigation with a united front and a never-say-die liti-
gation strategy in which it refused to settle and appealed at every op-
16. See infta notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
18. SeeJoseph R. Gusfield, The Social Symbolism of Smoking and Health, in SMOKING POL-
ICY. LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 49, 54 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
1993).
19. See id. at 53.
20. See Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Overview, in SMOKING POLIC: LAw,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 3, 5 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
21. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in
SMOKING POLICY. LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110, 112 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1993) [hereinafter Institutional and Historical Perspectives]. Please note,
much of the text of this article can also be found in Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of
the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv. 853, 854 (1992), supra note 8. However, for the
sake of clarity, each article will be cited to separately.
22. See Player, supra note 3, at 312.
23. See id. at 312 (discussing Roy Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 1952,
at 7 (condensing Roy Norr, Cancer by the Carton, CHRISTIAN HERALD, Oct. 1952)). In the
first article of the series published in Reader's Digest, "Cancer by the Carton," the author
found that the deaths associated with tobacco use may eventually reach mass-epidemic
proportions. See generally Norr, supra, at 7. In response, cigarette consumption among
adults fell two years in a row. See Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 112.
24. See Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 112.
25. See Sociolegal History, supra note 8, at 857.
26. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 131.
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portunity. 27 First, the industry used its tremendous resources to force
plaintiffs out of litigation. Since plaintiffs lawyers were working on a
contingency fee basis, industry lawyers inundated the opposition with
pre-trial litigation. 2' The industry used its vast resources to overbur-
den plaintiffs financially with interrogatories and depositions, all in an
attempt to deter plaintiffs and their lawyers from entering into seem-
ingly futile, expensive, and lengthy litigation.29 If the plaintiffs were
able to gather the resources to survive such pre-trial tactics, the indus-
try applied new tactics at the trial level.
The second never-say-die tactic the industry instituted was the use
of expert witnesses to frustrate plaintiffs' attempts to prove causation.
Once litigation began, defense attorneys hired expert witnesses in an
attempt to refute new-found medical evidence linking smoking and
disease."0 The legal standard at the time for a toxic tort claim placed
the burden of proof on plaintiffs to prove both general and specific
causation.3 Therefore, plaintiffs had to show that cigarettes were a
cause of their injury and that the cigarettes indeed did cause their par-
ticular injury."2 In Green v. American Tobacco Company,33 plaintiff and
industry lawyers each presented eight eminent medical doctors to tes-
tify on their behalf.3 4 The conflicting testimony left the jury with no
choice but to find that smoking was one of the proximate causes of the
victim's lung cancer. 5 This case is just one example of how the indus-
27. See Player, supra note 3, at 313; Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21,
at 113.
28. See Player, supra note 3, at 313; Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21,
at 113.
29. See Player, supra note 3, at 313; Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21,
at 113.
30. See Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 113.
31. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 132. "General causation" involves proof of a generaliz-
able effect of exposure to or use of a product. An inquiry into a question of general causa-
tion may yield three possible results: (1) the product always causes a particular injury, (2)
the product never causes a particular injury, or (3) the product may or may not cause a
particular injury depending on a number of factors beyond exposure to or use of the
product. See Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 677 (N.D. Ohio 1995). By contrast,
"specific causation" requires examination of the particular facts surrounding a plaintiffs
claim. "Even for those plaintiffs who are alleging the same injury, resolution as to one
plaintiff's claims will do nothing to prove another plaintiff's claim." Id.
32. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 132 (emphasis added).
33. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962). In this case, the plaintiff, who had smoked Lucky
Strike Cigarettes everyday from 1924 to 1956, argued that "he had incurred lung cancer as
a result of smoking defendant's product." Id. at 71-72.
34. See id. at 72.
35. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 132 (citing Green, 304 F.2d at 71-72).
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try used its resources to raise enough doubt as to causation to stop a
successful plaintiff verdict."
The final litigation tactic utilized by the industry in the first wave,
in addition to manipulating causation and using experts to frustrate
causation, was the use of foreseeability as a defense to plaintiff suits.
For example, in Lartigue v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Company,37 the tobacco
industry used foreseeability as a defense3" to show that R.J. Reynolds
could not be responsible for plaintiffs cancer because it did not know
of the dangers of smoking at the time the plaintiff contracted
cancer.
3 9
Although it was ultimately a change in the legal doctrine which
ended the first wave of tobacco suits,4" the industry's litigation tactics
and manipulation of causation and foreseeability brought a cessation
to such claims for nearly twenty years. 4 ' The industry exited the first
wave of litigation unscathed.
B. Public Opinion During The Second Wave (1980s)
In the 1980s, shifts in public opinion and industry tactics once
again combined in another round of tobacco litigation.42 While the
industry saw a cessation of litigation in the 1970s, several factors gave
viability to lawsuits in the 1980s. The Surgeon General's 1964 report
finding that cigarettes were an important public health hazard,43 the
36. See Green, 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962). See also Schwartz, supra note 9, at 132 (citing
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 482 (3rd Cir. 1965), as similar to
Green because the jury, although presented with conflicting evidence, concluded that
smoking Chesterfields was "one of the causes" of plaintiffs cancer).
37. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
38. See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 35-40 (upholding the verdict on grounds that smoking risks
were not foreseeable at the time the plaintiff developed cancer); Player, supra note 3, at
313-14.
39. See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39-40; Player, supra note 3, at 313-14.
40. See Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 117. The change in legal
doctrine occurred when Comment i to section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts
was changed to read, "Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the
effects of smoking may be harmful." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i
(1965). This was said to be the "death knell" for the first round of litigation. See Institu-
tional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 15, at 117.
41. See Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 118.
42. See Elsa F. Kramer, Tobacco Defense Strategies, 39 RES GESTAE 24, 24 (May 1996) (re-
ferring to Robert L. Rabin's comments on the tobacco industry's no-holds-barred strategy
and juries' unsympathetic view of plaintiffs who freely made the choice to smoke) [herein-
after Defense Strategies].
43. See Player, supra note 3, at 314 (citing PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF TH4E ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (Pub. No. 1103 (1964)).
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Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,44 growth of public dis-
dain for cigarette manufacturers, 45 and the success of cases against the
asbestos industry all gave viability to lawsuits against the tobacco com-
panies.46 Despite increased viability of plaintiff suits, the industry
once again utilized its resources to successfully defeat plaintiff
claims;47 however, the tactics used during the second wave were differ-
ent than those relied upon during the first wave. First, since the sec-
ond wave cases were brought on theories of strict liability, the industry
focused on the dangerousness of the cigarette itself to defeat plaintiff
claims.48 Secondly, the industry manipulated and withheld scientific
information on the dangers of smoking to influence public opinion.49
Finally, the industry used the very public disdain towards smoking that
it helped to create, to defend plaintiff claims on assumption of risk
theories and to attack the character of individual plaintiffs.5 ° Similar
to the first wave, the combination of the three litigation tactics al-
lowed the industry to exit the second wave unharmed."
First, plaintiff claims in the second wave were primarily based on
strict tort liability.52 Therefore, the industry was able to shift the focus
of the suits from foreseeability to the dangerousness of the cigarette
itself.53 On one hand, the industry encouraged juries to focus on the
dangerousness of cigarettes; on the other hand, the industry manipu-
lated scientific research to hide the fact that cigarettes were in fact
dangerous. For example, in response to the Surgeon General's 1964
report, the industry created a full page ad to run in local newspapers
44. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et. seq. (1997). The Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act was originally enacted in 1956.
45. See Frohlich, supra note 2, at 450-51 (attributing growth in public disdain for the
industry to the 1964 Surgeon General Report and the passage of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act in 1965). See also supra note 44.
46. See Frohlich, supra note 2, at 451 ("Toxic harm cases, especially the asbestos cases,
had laid an important groundwork for possible suits against the tobacco industry.").
47. See id.
48. See infta notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
51. See infta note 86 and accompanying text.
52. The theory of strict liability holds a defendant absolutely liable for harms suffered
by plaintiffs "in situations in which social policy requires that the defendant make good the
harm which results to others from abnormal risks" even though the defendant's acts them-
selves may not be illegal or blameworthy. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 14 (1974). "The basis of
liability in such cases is the intentional behavior in exposing the community to the abnor-
mal risk." Id.
53. See Player, supra note 3, at 315. Compare litigation tactics during the first wave,
where the industry successfully defeated foreseeability claims with the use of experts and
reliance on a constrained conception of foreseeability. See supra notes 37-39; Institutional
and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 115.
[VOL. 2:79
THE MANIPULATION OF PUBLIC OPINION
entitled "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers"5 4 that assured the
public that tobacco manufacturers were interested in protecting the
health of American citizens.
The ad also announced the industry's creation of the Council for
Tobacco Research (CTR)5 6 for the publicly-stated purpose of investi-
gating fully the new information 51 that smoking was causally con-
nected to lung cancer and disseminating its findings to the public.5 8
In order to investigate, the powerfully wealthy industry selectively
sponsored only the projects finding that smoking was not a health
hazard.5" If sponsored studies found otherwise, the CTR would stop
funding.6" In addition, the CTR filtered unfavorable results through a
"Special Projects" division which was inundated with attorneys at every
level to protect this information through the invocation of attorney
work-product privilege.6 The industry was successful in hiding the
unfavorable results by proclaiming that the purpose of the CTR was to
gather expert witnesses for tort suits.62 Although the CTR was proven
to be a public relations hoax forty years later,63 this council was suc-
cessful in ensuring victorious results for the industry throughout the
54. See Seong Hwan Kim, California's Unfair Competition Act: Will it Give Rise to Yet Another
'Wave' in Smoking and Health Litigation?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 193, 193 (1994). Appar-
ently, the industry never ran the ad. See Documents Reveal Tobacco Campaign Papers at Histari-
cal Society Show How Cigarette Makers Tried to Ease Health Fears, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb.
22, 1998, at B5. Until early February 1998, the ad had never been seen outside the tobacco
industry. See id.
55. See Kim, supra note 54, at 193 (citing Alix M. Freedman and Laurie P. Cohen, Smoke
and Mirrors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1993, at Al).
56. See id. at 193-94. The tobacco industry established and funded the Council for
Tobacco Research (CTR). See id. The CTR was originally named the Tobacco Industry
Council (TIRC). See Player, supra note 3, at 323. The industry claimed that the CTR would
be autonomous and "would fully investigate and disclose" its findings to the public. Kim,
supra note 54, at 194.
57. In 1962, Congress' Investigative Advisory Committee concluded that "cigarette
smoking [was] causally related to lung cancer, chronic bronchitis, emphysema and coro-
nary artery disease." Kim, supra note 54, at 193 (citing PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COM-
MITrEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (Pub. No. 1103 (1964)).
58. See id. at 193-94.
59. See id. at 195.
60. See id. (citing Alix M. Freedman & Laurie P. Cohen, Smoke and Mirrors, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 11, 1993, at Al).
61. See id. at 195-96.
62. See id. Because information collected in preparation for litigation is afforded spe-
cial protection, the tobacco industry could hide all adverse research through this division.
See supra text accompanying note 61.
63. See id. at 194.
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second wave by suppressing the connection between disease and
smoking.6
4
Finally, public disdain for smoking and smokers also had a signifi-
cant impact on jury verdicts in the 1980s. The focus of the second-
wave cases was the plaintiff's freedom of choice, and defense attorneys
relied on this shift in public sentiment to win cases.6 5 When warnings
were mandated in 1965,66 the public was slow to react. However, in
the years following, the public began to attribute fault to smokers who
chose to continue the habit despite the warnings.67 By 1986, even
though ninety-two percent of the public believed that smoking caused
lung cancer,68 this knowledge was outweighed by the strong public
sentiment that plaintiffs had made the conscious decision to smoke. 69
Therefore, industry attorneys were successful in arguing that plaintiffs
who ignored the clear and unequivocal warnings that smoking was
hazardous to their health assumed the risk of getting cancer or other
smoking related illnesses. 70 In effect, public knowledge of smoking
dangers allowed the industry to successfully defeat plaintiff claims by
arguing that the plaintiffs assumed the risk.
Moreover, by the 1980s, the movement against smoking which
had sparked the first round of litigation had also added a moral tone
to smoking.71 The public began to reason that if someone continued
to smoke despite the widely-disseminated warnings, they lacked char-
acter because a sensible person would want to live a healthy life;
72
therefore, smoking was not sensible.73 Similarly, as reports surfaced
in the 1980s about the possible harmful effects of second hand
smoke, 74 non-smokers began to view smokers as "pariahs."75 Although
64. See Player, supra, note 3, at 323-24 (explaining that the CTR's manipulation of its
findings allowed the industry to keep "damaging findings" from plaintiffs).
65. See Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 122.
66. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
67. See Rabin and Sugarman, supra note 20, at 4.
68. See id.
69. See Gusfield, supra note 18, at 61.
70. See Waiting to Exhale, supra note 6, at 20. Assumption of risk is a defense to negli-
gence and may be raised by the defendant when the plaintiff has given her/his express or
implied consent, in advance, to take her/his chance with a known risk that is in some way
the result of the defendant's conduct. See PROSSER & KEENTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 480-
81 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 1984). This consent relieves the defendant of a legal duty
that would normally be owed to the plaintiff for such conduct. See id. at 481.
71. See Gusfield, supra note 18, at 61.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 64 (citing SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING (1986)); Rabin & Sugarman, supra
note 20, at 3-4 ("side-stream" smoke is at least as rich in carcinogens as inhaled tobacco
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public health campaigns contributed to this shift in public morals,76
the industry's suppression of documents through the CTR77 was cru-
cial to the long-standing viability of this viewpoint. As discussed ear-
lier, the creation of the CTR and invocation of attorney work-product
privilege7' allowed the industry to hide its knowledge of the addictive
qualities of nicotine. 7 Therefore, the public was able to blame the
foolish, undisciplined individual who made the choice to smoke de-
spite warnings to the contrary."0 The growing public disdain for
smokers, in fact perpetuated by the industry through the CTR and the
suppression of documents, aided the industry in its success against
plaintiff claims.
The industry's lawyers took advantage of this shift in public opin-
ion in litigation. They incorporated character assassinations of plain-
tiffs into their defenses highlighting any irresponsible behavior that
could be linked to the resulting poor health condition. 81 A character
assassination was used by industry lawyers in Galbraith v. R.J Reynolds
to induce the jury into finding that the plaintiff's health condition was
caused by factors other than smoking.82 Furthermore, since the in-
dustry was able to suppress its knowledge of the addictive qualities of
nicotine,8 it was able to withstand a plaintiff's addiction argument by
pointing out that everyone knew someone was able to quit smoking. 4
Since juries could easily relate to this argument, it was often used by
industry attorneys throughout the second wave. The manipulation of
public opinion about smoking and smokers, the focus on the danger-
ousness of cigarettes, and the use of assumption of risk defenses and
smoke; reliable studies indicate that "passive smokers" have a significantly higher rate of
lung cancer than those relatively unexposed to tobacco smoke).
75. Gusfield, supra note 18, at 65 (The smoker as pariah is "someone to be excluded
from casual sociability unless he or she abides by the rules of nonsmoking.").
76. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
79. See Waiting to Exhale, supra note 6, at 20; see also infra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text. In fact, the industry was doing more than just suppressing information regarding the
addictive qualities of nicotine. Evidence emerged that during this time period tobacco
companies were working with biotechnology firms in Brazil to develop strains of tobacco
with twice the normal level of nicotine. See Biotechnology Firm Says it Helped Tobacco Interests
Increase Nicotine Content, 11 MEALEY'S LrrIG. REPORT: TOBACCO 14, 14 (Jan. 1998).
80. See Gusfield, supra note 18, at 61.
81. See Player, supra note 3, at 316.
82. See Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 121-22 (citing Galbraith v.
RJ. Reynolds, No. C144147 (Cal. Nov. 20, 1995)). In this case, the defense focused on the
fact that the plaintiff may have suffered from nonsmoking-related illnesses, such as heart
disease; however, no autopsy had been performed. See id. at 121.
83. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
84. See Player, supra note 3, at 318.
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character attacks to defeat plaintiff claims allowed the second wave of
litigation to end with plaintiffs failing to make a single recovery."5
Although the growing mistrust of the tobacco industry was evidenced
by a few minor adverse findings at the trial level, the industry's use of
these litigation tactics in the second wave allowed it to escape virtually
unharmed.86
C. Significant Events Shaping Public Opinion During the
Third Wave (1990 - Present)
Modern cases against the tobacco industry, comprising the third
wave, have arisen because of foul play by the industry.87 First, docu-
ments have exposed fraud by at least one major industry player.88 Sec-
ondly, several industry employees have begun to testify about the
widespread fraud in the industry.89 These events have not only led to
a resurgence of litigation, but also have raised public disdain for the
industry to a new level.9" Plaintiffs are bringing several new forms of
claims against the industry which may prove to be more successful
than first and second wave claims.9' At first glance, it appears that the
industry may be losing its edge.
In the early 1990s, amidst rumors of foul play within the industry,
specifically the abuse of the work-product doctrine, judges began
threatening defense attorneys with orders to override this privilege.92
The industry's luck ultimately ran out in 1994 when several thousand
pages of damaging internal documents were shipped anonymously to
a professor at the University of California, San Diego.93 Known as the
85. Id. at 319. Rabin marks the end of the second wave with Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
505 U.S. 504 (1992). See Institutional and Historical Perspectives, supra note 21, at 125.
Although the defendants in Cipollone were ultimately victorious, this case does provide evi-
dence of a shift injury sentiment towards the tobacco industry. In Cipollone, the NewJersey
jury did allocate 20% of the fault to the tobacco industry. See id. at 122-23. New Jersey,
however, was a comparative fault state, and a plaintiff could not recover unless the defend-
ant was found to be more than 50% at fault. See id. at 123. Since the jury's allocation of
fault to the industry was only 20%, plaintiff did not recover any damages. In addition, the
jury awarded $400,000 in damages to the deceased's husband; however, the jury's award
was overturned on appeal. See Player, supra note 3, at 319.
86. See Player, supra note 3, at 319.
87. See Waiting to Exhale, supra note 6, at 20-23.
88. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
89. See infta notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
90. See Waiting to Exhale, supra note 6, at 20-23.
91. See infra notes 104-39 and accompanying notes.
92. See Waiting to Exhale, supra note 6, at 20. In 1992, a United States District Court
judge planned to release some of the industry's internal papers held by the CTR, but an
appeals court upheld the industry's claim of privilege. See id. (citing Haines v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J. 1992)).
93. See Player, supra note 3, at 322.
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Cigarette Papers,94 these documents proved the existence of wide-
spread fraud by industry-giant Brown & Williamson and highlighted
industry knowledge of both the addictive qualities of nicotine and the
correlation between tobacco use and cancer.15 For the first time, the
fraudulent tactics of the CTR were brought to the attention of the
masses.9 6 The industry's suppression of scientific research was begin-
ning to come to the forefront of public knowledge.
Moreover, in the spring of 1997, the Liggett Group, a small
United States tobacco company who was facing bankruptcy, broke its
united front with the tobacco industry to work with the Attorneys Gen-
eral.9 7 This shifting of loyalty could prove more significant than the
discovery of the Cigarette Papers, as the Liggett Group's testimony has
confirmed fraudulent actions within the entire industry.9" Liggett of-
ficials have offered evidence of industry-wide efforts to increase the
levels of nicotine in cigarettes and to market directly to minors in its
advertisements.99 This knowledge of industry fraud has had a substan-
tial effect on recent lawsuits.
For example, in Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., a jury
awarded $750,000 in damages to the plaintiff.100 In jury interviews
following the trial, jurors characterized the defense attorney's attack
of the plaintiffs character as abusive. 10' Due to the growing knowl-
edge of a deceitful tobacco industry, the successful litigation tactics
employed in the second wave' 0 2 turned against the industry as public
opinion shifted. Since the industry's fraudulent practices have been
exposed, plaintiffs can have more confidence that their claims will
succeed. 103
94. See generally STANLEY A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996).
95. Waiting to Exhale, supra note 6, at 20-21.
96. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
97. See Player, supra note 3, at 330 ("The deal between Liggett and the Attorneys Gen-
eral provided protection for Liggett in exchange for establishing a fund to reimburse the
states and for cooperating in the suits against all other non-settling tobacco companies.").
98. See id. at 331.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 338 (discussing Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No.
95934CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 9, 1996), rev'd per curiam, No. 96-4831, 1998 MWL 323484 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. June 22, 1998)).
101. See id. (citing Suein L. Huang et al., Smoke Signal:Juy's Tobacco Verdict Suggests Tough
Times Ahead for the Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1996, at Al).
102. See supra notes 42-86 and accompanying text.
103. See id. at 331 (citing Carter, No. 95934CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 9, 1996), as evidence of
plaintiff success); but see Carter, No. 96-4831, 1998 WL 323484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 22,
1998), revg, No. 95934CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 9, 1996) (possibly proving that plaintiffs
should not have more confidence that their claims will succeed since Carter, No. 95934CA,
was overturned).
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Such changes in the widespread viewpoint of the industry have
left it ripe for downfall. Lawsuits against the tobacco industry in the
third wave have taken on three distinct forms. States have instituted
claims to recover Medicaid costs,1" 4 non-smokers have instituted class
actions based on harm suffered from second-hand smoke, °5 and indi-
vidual plaintiffs continue to file suit. t°6
When the states began to bring suits for the recovery of Medicaid
claims,1 1 7 the industry realized it would most likely have to abandon
its never-say-die litigation strategy and settle the claims. This settle-
ment decision was based on the industry's knowledge of the likely suc-
cess of state suits.0 . which were much different in character than
individual plaintiff suits."0 9 The state suits focused on both the al-
leged fraud of the tobacco industry in withholding information from
the public and on the independent financial harm the states have suf-
fered in reimbursing Medicaid claims without undertaking any risk." 0
The basis of a state claim is demonstrated by Florida's complaint
in its 1995 case against the industry."' The complaint stated,
In the name of profits, cigarette manufacturers choose to ig-
nore and suppress the truth about the hazards of cigarette
smoking. As a result, Medicaid recipients have contracted
smoking-related diseases including . . . cancer, emphysema,
and heart disease. The care of these Medicaid recipients has
placed a significant burden on the State. 12
The complaint alluded to industry fraud by alleging that the tobacco
industry is responsible for the diseases suffered by Florida Medicaid
recipients since their use of cigarettes was foreseeable and intended
by the industry." 3 Since Florida suffered an independent harm in
104. See infra notes 107-27 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
107. For example, in 1994, the Florida Legislature passed a law which allowed the state
to sue the tobacco industry for Medicaid expenses attributable to smoking. See Fla. Stat.
§§ 16.59, 409.907, 409.910 (Supp. 1994).
108. See Player, supra note 3, at 341 (opining that the settlement "show[s] that the indus-
try is no longer willing to fight until the bitter end").
109. See Frohlich, supra note 2, at 451-52 (describing the focus of the Medicaid suits).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 452-53 and 453 n.77 (citing Complaint, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 95-
1466AO (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 21, 1995)).
112. See generally, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Says Federal Government "Clearly Enti-
tled" to Share of Medicaid Tobacco Settlement Payments, 9 HEALTH NEws DAILY 14 (1997) (citing
Complaint, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466A0 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 21, 1995))
[hereinafter Center on Budget and Policy Piorities].
113. See generally, id. (citing Complaint, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466AO (Fla.
Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 21, 1995)).
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which they had no choice but to pay the Medicaid costs, the state ar-
gued that the industry's assumption of risk defense should be ren-
dered useless.114
The use of testimony by industry employees was significantly dam-
aging in state suits because it had been used to prove industry fraud.
Several former industry employees have agreed to testify against the
industry in these state cases. 1 5 For example, in the Mississippi Medi-
caid case,l 16 Jeffrey Wigand, a top research scientist for Brown & Wil-
liamson, testified that the industry refused to remove a known
carcinogenic additive from cigarettes, that in-house lawyers hid poten-
tially damaging research, and that the work-product privilege was
abused among industry lawyers.11 ' Similarly, in the Minnesota Medi-
caid suit,"' Bennett LeBow, chairman of the Liggett Group, agreed to
testify that the industry had knowledge of the addictive qualities of
nicotine. 1 ' Testimony by industry employees more often than not
illustrated industry fraud.
Interestingly, former employees who have remained loyal to the
industry have proven just as harmful as those who turned against it.
During depositions for the Minnesota case,12° former Philip Morris
research scientist Thomas Osdene invoked his fifth amendment privi-
lege 135 times. 21 Although the industry wanted Osdene to answer
questions because they claimed he had "nothing to hide," he consist-
ently invoked the privilege when shown his own hand-written memos;
one of his memos stated, "I believe the thing we sell most is nico-
tine." '2 2 Although the industry attempted to keep Osdene's deposi-
114. See Frohlich, supra note 2, at 459.
115. See Waiting to Exhale, supra note 6, at 21-22.
116. Moore v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County filed May
23, 1994).
117. See Waiting to Exhale, supra note 6, at 22 (discussing deposition testimony given in
Moore v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County filed May 23,
1994)).
118. State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CI-94-8565 (Dist. Ct. Ramsey County filed Aug. 18,
1994).
119. See Minnesota Trial Continues with Video of Deposition of Philip Morris Scientist, 11 MEA-
LEY'S LITIG. REPORT: TOBACCO 3, 4 (Jan. 1998) [hereinafter Minnesota Trial Continues]. A
court official in the Minnesota lawsuit has also admitted 38,000 pages of never-released
tobacco industry documents. See id. at 5. These documents are said to be the star attrac-
tion of the trial. See id.
120. State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Dist. Ct. Ramsey County filed Aug. 18,
1994).
121. See Minnesota Trial Continues, supra note 119, at 3. Osdene was able to invoke the
5th amendment privilege since he has been summoned to testify before a grand jury as
part of a Department of Justice investigation of the tobacco industry. See id.
122. See id.
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tion out of the trial, claiming that it was highly prejudicial, the judge
deemed it admissible.' 23 In sum, even loyal industry employees who
try to protect the industry may be unable to continue to hide industry
fraud.
Internal industry memos similar to the Cigarette Papers,1 24 have
also played a dramatic role in exposing industry fraud. For example,
in the Minnesota trial, hundreds of damaging internal memos have
been introduced into evidence. 125 In this case, plaintiffs attorneys at-
tempted to fuel public disdain for the industry by posting the docu-
ments on the internet.1 26 Furthermore, the industry was ordered to
turn over 38,000 never-before-released industry documents to the
state; the documents have been described as "the crown jewels of the
conspiracy." 127 The compelled admission of internal industry memos
has further exposed industry fraud.
In addition to state suits, tobacco litigation in the third wave has
also taken the form of class action suits. Some of these suits have been
based upon injuries caused by exposure to second-hand smoke. 12  In
1992, studies confirmed a correlation between Environmental To-
bacco Smoke and lung cancer as well as with respiratory ailments in
young children.' 29 Due to such findings, class actions against the to-
bacco industry skyrocketed and took on many forms. Although chal-
lenged by the industry at their formation, generally courts have
allowed the suits to go forward. Most recently, a class action has been
filed on behalf of Louisiana residents who have suffered injuries due
to second-hand smoke.' 13  Plaintiffs named both tobacco manufactur-
ers and retailers as defendants.13 ' Defendants sought to remove the
case from state to federal court claiming that the plaintiff only joined
the Louisiana retailers to avoid removal.' 32 However, the court de-
nied the industry's motions for dismissal.'1 3 Since this case survived
123. See id.
124. See supra note 94.
125. See Minnesota Trial Continues, supra note 119, at 4.
126. See id. See also Blue Cross and Blueshield of Minnesota Tobacco Website (visited Sep. 3,
1998) <http://www.mnbluecrosstobacco.com>.
127. See Minnesota Trial Continues, supra note 119, at 4.
128. See Defense Strategies, supra note 42, at 24. For example, a group of airline flight
attendants were granted certification to file a class action suit claiming injury caused by
second-hand smoke on thejob. See id. (discussing Tobacco Merchants Ass'n of the United
States v. Broin, 657 So.2d 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
129. See Rabin and Sugarman, supra note 20, at 3.
130. See generally Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, supra note 112 (referring to Young
v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-3851, 1998 WL 42589 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 1998)).
131. See Young, 1998 WL 42589 at *1.
132. See id.
133. See id. at *2.
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industry tactics, it is significant for stretching responsibility to tobacco
retailers for knowledge of the dangers of second-hand smoke. 34
Individual claims comprising the third type of third wave lawsuits
have already been successful. For example, in June 1998, a Florida
jury ordered Brown & Williamson to pay $1 million to the family of a
man who died from smoking Lucky Strikes for almost fifty years."'
"This verdict marks the first time a tobacco company has been or-
dered to pay punitive damages in a smoking liability case." 136 Interest-
ingly, one of the arguments used by the plaintiffs was that Brown &
Williamson conspired with other tobacco companies to hide the
health risks of smoking from the public.137 Through the introduction
of "mountains"'3 8 of industry documents, plaintiffs were able to sup-
port this conspiracy argument and reach an unprecedented verdict. 39
Whether this verdict will start a trend of individual suits in tobacco
litigation remains to be seen. Inundated with litigation, whether in
the form of state suits, class actions, or individual suits, the tobacco
industry became aware that it had to work quickly to implement a new
strategy for survival.
II. MODERN TACTICS OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN
MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION
The recent public disclosure of wide-spread fraud among the to-
bacco industry has raised contempt for the industry to a new level.
Consequently, the modern era of tobacco litigation has changed dras-
tically. For the first time, the industry had to reconsider its never-say-
die litigation strategy of the past and negotiate a settlement. 4 ° The
industry nonetheless has continued to manipulate public opinion in
its quest to gain support. As a result, public interest in tobacco issues
is now more politically-charged than ever. 4 ' Most likely, the industry
134. See id. at *1. The plaintiffs claimed that retailers should be liable in tort if they
knew of the defect in the cigarettes they were selling. See id.
135. See Ron Ward, Tobacco Company to Pay $1 Million - Largest Tobacco Verdict Ever, DAILy
RECORD, June 11, 1998, at 3C (discussing Maddox v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
'No. 97-3522-Ca. Div. CV-H (Cir. Ct. Duval County June 10, 1998)).
136. Id.
137. See id. The jury assessed $500,000 in compensatory damages and $450,000 in puni-
tive damages. See id. The family had asked for $850,000 in compensatory damages and $16
to $42 million in punitive damages based on Brown & Williamson's net worth of $843
million. See id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See infra notes 14-41, 52-85 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 52-85 and accompanying text.
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will attempt to take advantage of the political debate to invoke public
sympathy.
A. National Tobacco Settlement
In June of 1997, the industry and State's Attorneys General an-
nounced a proposed national settlement with the tobacco industry.142
Realizing the fate ahead, the industry knew it had to somehow reach a
settlement in which it could limit its liability. The industry recognized
an ambush of state lawsuits could devastate its finances and render it
bankrupt14 much like the ill-fated asbestos industry of the 1980s. 1 44
Likewise, the states were willing to settle in order to establish a uni-
form resolution of the tobacco issue and to avoid wasting time and
resources fighting the industry's litigation tactics. 45 Aware of the vital
importance of public opinion to its future, the industry launched a
grass roots campaign to foster public support. 46 Since a national set-
tlement would ultimately require Congressional approval, the industry
attempted to create an informed citizenry to exert pressure on its rep-
resentatives. 147  However, the industry's use of "populist and anti-
Washington" tactics did much more than inform the public. 48 In
fact, the tobacco resolution was similar to the industry's past attempts
to manipulate public opinion in many ways.
B. The Marketing of the Tobacco Resolution
The Tobacco Resolution was introduced to the public through a
mass advertising campaign designed to invoke public sympathy for the
industry.'49 Hoping to influence public opinion,15 ° the industry pre-
pared comprehensible articles on the dangers of smoking, dissemi-
142. See Player, supra note 3, at 339.
143. See id. at 341.
144. See PatrickJ. Hagan, et al., Totaling Up the Costs of Asbestos Litigation: Guess Who Will
Pay the Price?, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 2 (1990) (maintaining that "at least seven"
manufacturers of asbestos or asbestos-containing products went bankrupt as a result of the
1980s asbestos litigation).
145. If the States sustained their Medicaid suits to judgment, they would undoubtedly
expend vast resources to fight the industry's no-holds-barred litigation tactics previously
used in the first three waves of litigation.
146. See infta notes 149-69 and accompanying text; Philip Morris Inc. et al., The Tobacco
Settlement: What's in it for You? What's in it for Us? (visited Mar. 10, 1998) <http://
www.tobaccoresolution.com> [hereinafter What's in it for You?].
147. See What's In It For You?, supra note 146.
148. Big Tobacco Goes on the Offensive, CARROLL CouNrv TiMES, Apr. 10, 1998, at A5 [here-
inafter Big Tobacco].
149. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
150. See Philip Morris Inc., et al., Tobacco Industry Begins Advertising to Build Understanding
of Comprehensive Resolution (visited Mar. 10, 1998) < http://www.tobaccoresolution.com>
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nated through the widely-distributed Reader's Digest, similar to the
tactics used in the second wave' 5 ' and, televised spots to educate the
citizenry about the settlement. 152 The industry's damage-control tac-
tics were similar in content and character to the full page ads the in-
dustry ran after release of the Surgeon General's famed 1964
report.153 Its vast resources allowed the industry to finance prime-
time commercials 54 and to create a website155 to exert significant in-
fluence on public opinion.
The industry's commercials and website stressed that the tobacco
companies would not be immune from lawsuits.1 56  And, the funds
from the proposed $368.5 billion settlement would go towards cam-
paigns to reduce youth smoking and for medical research to cure
smoking-related illnesses.' 57  Since the average citizen would most
likely do nothing more to inform her or himself, these commercials
were an effective means of convincing potential future jurors to soften
their views of the industry. However, if viewers were convinced by the
commercial to visit the industry's website, they would be even further
indoctrinated with industry rhetoric.
The website immediately attempted to appeal to the public with
the title, "The Tobacco Settlement: What's in it for You? What's in it
for Us?"'58 The website began by highlighting that the "agreement
imposes unprecedented legal and financial burdens upon us ....
Even though these recommendations place extensive demands upon
our industry, we are willing to except them .... Indeed, we have made
concessions that give up our constitutional rights."' 59 This appeal to
public sympathy was fraudulent in many ways. First, there was vivid
awareness within the industry that it may be headed for bankruptcy if
(defining the ad campaign as a public education campaign) [hereinafter Tobacco Industry
Begins Advertising].
151. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
152. See generally Ceci Connolly, Big Tobacco to Fight Legislation with Ad Blitz, Lobbying Net-
work, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1998, at A6.
153. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Connolly, supra note 152. See also Philip Morris Inc. et al., The Tobacco
Resolution: Advertising (visited Mar. 10, 1998) < http://www.tobaccoresolution.com> (con-
taining links to the television ads).
155. See generally Philip Morris Inc., et al., The Tobacco Resolution (visited March 30, 1998)
<http://www.tobaccoresolution.com>. This site includes the text of the proposed settle-
ment, a series of commonly asked questions with the industry's response, a cover page
which explains the industry's reasons for entering the settlement, and links to print and
television ads.
156. See What's in it for You?, supra note 146.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Id.
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it did not settle its claims and cap liability. 6 ' Secondly, the "extensive
demands"' 1 placed on the industry by the settlement paled in com-
parison to the effects of the potential litigation facing the industry.
Through settling, the industry could avoid attorney costs 1 6 2 and the
threat of unprecedented punitive claims assessed by an unforgiving
public. The industry also hid the fact that $368.5 billion was only
twenty-five percent of the industry's total resources.163 Although the
tobacco industry was aware that the settlement was its last vein of exist-
ence, it attempted to elicit public sympathy with a mis-characterization
of the facts.
The website also addressed what the settlement would mean for
the public. Once again, the industry attempted to elude the public
with clever language. For example, the web page claimed that the
industry would "NOT" be granted immunity.1 64 According to the Co-
alition for Workers in Health Care, however, the proposed liability
caps were a creative way to achieve immunity from lawsuits. 165 Be-
cause industry payouts of legal judgments were capped at $5 billion
per year,' 66 plaintiffs would presumably have to wait decades before
receiving theirjudgments. Furthermore, in the cases being tried after
the $5 billion cap was met in a given year, defense attorneys would
likely argue that the industry was overburdened financially by the
payouts, in an attempt to invoke juror sympathy for the industry. If
that strategy was successful, plaintiffs suing after the $5 billion annual
cap was met would be denied recovery. As a practical result, the in-
dustry would be immunized from suit.
The industry also attempted to paint itself as a patron of the pub-
lic. It appealed to the public to protect this mass employer who
"make[s] valuable contributions to the U.S. economy [by providing]
hundreds of thousands of jobs [and paying] billions of dollars in
160. Cf Player, supra note 3, at 341 (describing the settlement as the industry's "last
desperate attempt to avoid the tsunami of [looming] claims"). The proposed settlement
would cap liability at "33% of the annual industry-based payment [and thereby] limit [ ]
the amount of compensatory damages which [would] be paid each year." Id. at 340; see also
Philip Morris Inc., et al., Proposed Settlement: Title VII: Civil Liability, § B(9) (visited Mar. 10,
1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.com>. Furthermore, the excess of claimant awards
over $1 million would roll into the next year. See id. All settling tobacco companies would
share all payments. See id.
161. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing the industry's conception of
the demands the settlement placed upon it).
162. See Player, supra note 3, at 340.
163. See id. at 341.
164. See What's in it for You?, supra note 146. But see Player, supra note 3, at 339.
165. See Tobacco Road Settlement II: Groups React to McCain Bill, American Political Net-
work Health Line, Mar. 31, 1998, available in WESTLAW, APN-HE database.
166. See What's in it for You?, supra note 146.
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taxes." '16 7 It urged the public to support the agreement and put an
end to the "decades of fruitless conduct, where no one wins."' 6 8 In
fact, since the 1950s, it has been the industry who has won repeatedly
by draining the resources of the private plaintiff who attempted to
bring suit.16 9 When presented with the need to appeal to the public,
however, this past abuse of litigation tactics was never mentioned. In
an attempt to foster public sympathy, the industry once again resorted
to fraud to gain the support of the masses.
C. Congressional Response
An important contingency in any proposed settlement with the
tobacco industry was the requirement of Congressional approval.
Considering the politicized nature of tobacco issues,17 ° along with the
growing unpopularity of the industry,' 71 it was not surprising that
Congress made changes to the settlement. Although the industry had
been able to buy political support in the past through extravagant
campaign contribution,' 72 such tactics did not enjoy as much success
today since politicians did not want to be labeled industry-friendly. 173
Congress's Commerce Committee responded to the original set-
tlement with a $516 billion deal which afforded less protection against
liability for the industry and would raise the cost of cigarettes. 174 Con-
gress based its reasons for the increased deal on the need to satisfy its
constituents.' 75 According to Representative Robert Matsui, the in-
crease was promulgated because "people want us to hit [tobacco]
hard."' 76 Although the proposed settlement would have increased
the cigarettes tax by $1.10 per pack, it was believed that constituents
would favor the increase due to their "deep-seated mistrust" of the
industry.'7 7 Furthermore, research indicated that people did not have
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See supra text accompanying note 27.
170. See generally Jonathon Weisman, Tobacco Settlement "Is Dead:" RJR Sparks Revolt by In-
dustry Against Expensive Senate Deal; Firms Spurn More Talks; Clinton, Congress Vow to Fight,
Efforts To Reach National Agreement All But Collapse, BALT. SUN, Apr. 19, 1998, Al.
171. SeeJohn Harwood andJeffery Taylor, Tobacco's Maneuvers Could Further Fracture GOP,
WALL ST.J., Apr. 13, 1998, at A24 (describing "runaway antitobacco [(sic)] sentiment" as
the driving force behind the settlement).
172. See Big Tobacco, supra note 148.
173. See generally Weisman, supra note 170 (describing bi-partisan fear of being labeled
an industry-supporter).
174. See Harwood and Taylor, supra note 171.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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the same cynical view of tobacco taxes as they may have of increases in
property or sales taxes. 178 Ultimately, the public's reaction to in-
creased cigarette costs came down to their desire to punish the to-
bacco industry.
D. The Tobacco Industry's Walkout
Due to its patterns of past fraudulent conduct, it is no wonder
that the tobacco industry's decision to walk out of settlement hearings
was viewed with skepticism. 179 It is widely believed that the decision to
leave the talks was a ploy to invoke public sympathy for an industry
who was treated unfairly by Congress. 8' This belief is supported by
the industry's manipulation of public opinion throughout the settle-
ment process.' 81 For example, an industry press release described the
advertising campaign as a "'just the facts"' education seminar to en-
courage public support of the settlement;182 however, the education
provided was selective. The industry used the advertising/education
campaign as a ploy to encourage the public to blame Congress if the
settlement did not work.
Statements by industry representatives following the walkout sug-
gested that the industry did use the advertising campaign to en-
courage the public to blame Congress for any settlement failure.
18 1
For example, Nicholas G. Brookes, chairman and chief executive of-
ficer of Brown & Williamson, placed the blame for the settlement fail-
ure on Congress. According to Brookes, "Partisan politics, the
absence of White House leadership and an obsession for punishing
the industry have all but destroyed any hopes of achieving a workable
solution." '84 The industry's use of its public education campaign to
manipulate the public into blaming Congress for the resolution's fail-
ure is simply a continuation of its use of deceptive strategies.
Another interesting tactic used by the tobacco industry to elicit
public support for its position was the claim that the settlement
178. See id.
179. See Weisman, supra note 170.
180. See id.
181. See supra notes 149-69 and accompanying text.
182. Tobacco Industry Begins Advertising, supra note 150 (quoting Steven C. Parrish, senior
vice president of Philip Morris Inc.).
183. Cf. What's in it for You?, supra note 146 ("[The] President and Congress have a
unique opportunity to chart a new direction by passing comprehensive federal legislation
on a national tobacco settlement. We're ready to work to make the agreement final
184. Weisman, supra note 170.
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taxes 8 5 would put it out of business by creating a black market for
cigarettes.1 8 6 Although the public believed this to some extent,18 7 the
industry's black market arguments did not gain much support in
Washington. White House domestic policy chief Bruce Reed stated
that "the industry's 'arguments aren't convincing, and their credibil-
ity is low to begin with.'
18 8
The political nature of tobacco issues influenced other settlement
arguments as well. In order to invoke public support, the tobacco is-
sue had been framed in terms of an effort to reduce youth smok-
ing.' 8 9 Both politicians and the industry relied on this argument to
appear as the most noble patron of the public."' 0 The industry's
stance that it wanted to reduce youth smoking, however, was hypocriti-
cal. In fact, the very reason that youth smoking was an issue was a
result of the industry's direct marketing to minors. Knowing that nic-
otine was addictive, the industry intentionally targeted youths in order
to increase sales.1 9 ' Furthermore, under its proposed settlement, the
industry did not have to institute any marketing restrictions on inter-
national sales. 92 It could continue to market to minors in other
countries in the same way it targeted minors in the United States. If
the industry was truly concerned with the health of young individuals,
it should not have to draw a distinction between an American youth
and a foreign youth. Once again, the industry provided the American
public with lip service of a noble cause. Considering the industry's
continued use of deceptive public relations tactics, it is no wonder
that its sudden claim to curb youth smoking was viewed with
skepticism.
185. One week before the walkout, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee approved a $1.10 federal tax increase per pack of cigarettes. See id.
186. See Big Tobacco, supra note 148.
187. See Philip Morris Inc., et al., Americans Do Not Support Congressional Action on McCain
Legislation According to New Survey: Current Proposal Seen as Not Likely to Reduce the Levels of
Youth Smoking (visited Mar. 10, 1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.com> (citing the cre-
ation of a black market for cigarettes as one of the public's biggest concerns about the
proposed settlement).
188. Harwood and Taylor, supra note 171.
189. See Tobacco Industry Begins Advertising, supra note 150 ("When [the American peo-
ple] learn the facts, we believe they will increasingly come to view that the proposed resolu-
tion makes sense and will also make important and immediate contributions to lowering youth
smoking ... " (emphasis added)).
190. See Harwood and Taylor, supra note 171 (describing Congress' reliance on the re-
duce-youth-smoking-with-the-settlement proposition); What's in it for You, supra note 146
(describing the industry's reliance on the reduce-youth-smoking-with-the-settlement
proposition).
191. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
192. See Philip Morris Inc., et al., Proposed Settlement: Title I: Reformation of the Tobacco
Industry (visited March 30, 1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.com>.
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The industry also argued that if Congress drove it out of business
hundreds of thousands of Americans would be out of work.19 3 The
industry wanted to be viewed as a champion of the American people
as a mass employer. Once again, however, this tactic was unsuccessful
since mistrust of the industry was at an all-time high.194
Although many industry employees are not at fault for its miscon-
duct, the industry as a whole has been characterized as evil and deserv-
ing of punishment. Whether the public's resentment for the industry
is so strong as to outweigh any sympathy for employees who face the
possibility of losing their jobs is yet to be determined.
The success of the industry's decision to walk out of the settle-
ment talks is uncertain. The predominant mistrust and disdain for
the industry among the public and politicians alike is unquestionably
a detriment to the industry.195 With resentment for past tactics at an
unprecedented level, it is possible that a tobacco settlement will move
through Congress without the presence of tobacco attorneys. The ef-
fects of the walkout on public opinion inevitably will advance public
disdain for an already unpopular industry. 196 Since every move the
industry made was viewed with skepticism, a walkout provided further
evidence of foul play.
193. Cf What's in it for You?, supra note 146 (claiming that the proposed resolution
would allow "tobacco companies [to] continue to employ hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
cans"). See also Big Tobacco, supra note 148 (citing industry as arguing that Congress' pro-
posed bill would drive farmers, retailers and small business people from their jobs because
of competition with black market dealers).
194. See Harwood and Taylor, supra note 171 (describing public opinion as "runaway
antitobacco [(sic)] sentiment").
195. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
196. The tide has not only turned against tobacco, it keeps rising. Realization of
this prompted the companies to seek the so-called 'national settlement' lastJune.
It also pushed them to negotiate $30 billion in settlements of state lawsuits, and it
surely played a role in the decision . . . to cease participation in the legislative
process. Tobacco's Pique: Industry Walkout is a Constructive Step, STAR TRIB. (MINNE-
AOLIS-ST. PAUL), Apr. 20, 1998, at 12A.
The industry walkout sparked anti-industry comments among members of Congress. See
generally, Bara Vaida, U.S. Congress' Drive for Tobacco Bill Not Dead Despite Industry Walkout,
AFX NEws, Apr. 9, 1998, available in WESTLAW, USNEWS database. Senator John McCain
said, "...[I]f the tobacco companies do not go along with this agreement or the final
agrement (sic), public opinion will clearly not be on their side." Id. Speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich had a similar reaction to the walkout: "I don't think any serious person is
going to take tobacco companies' claims about anything seriously for a long, long time."
Alison Mitchell, For Tobacco, A Big Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1998, at Al.
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III. CONCLUSION
It is estimated that 494,000 annual deaths are attributable to
smoking.' 97 This confirmed link between smoking and terminal ill-
ness has encouraged litigation against the tobacco industry for almost
half a century. Throughout the litigation process, however, the to-
bacco industry has relied on fraudulent tactics to ensure successful
results. Over the years, the industry matched its litigation and public
relations strategies with the prevailing sentiment of the day. The in-
dustry suppressed information as to the addictive qualities of nicotine
in an attempt to advance public opinion that smokers assumed the
risk of contracting disease. Such a reliance on public opinion, how-
ever, turned against the industry when occurrences of wide-spread
fraud became public information. Although the tobacco industry has
attempted to invoke public sympathy by proclaiming abusive tactics by
Congress, or by establishing itself as an advocate against youth smok-
ing and mass employer of American citizens, public resentment for
past fraud appears to outweigh any sympathy. Due to the magnitude
of this resentment, the industry, who relied on the citizenry to survive
an onslaught of litigation, may be pushed out of existence by the very
same people.
197. See Rabin and Sugarman, supra note 20, at 3-4 (citing U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT chpt. 2 (1986)).
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